



Salama Fikira

Contents

Executive Summary	2
a. Threat Assessment	2
b. Site Security Assessment	2
Security Threat Assessment.....	3
a. Crime	3
b. Kidnapping.....	4
c. Smuggling.....	5
d. Civil unrest.....	5
e. Road traffic accidents.....	6
f. Terrorism	6
g. UXOs	7
Conclusions	7
ANNEX 1 – Risk Matrix.....	9

Executive Summary

a. Threat Assessment

- The main threats facing the site are opportunistic crime in the form of low-impact roadside robberies or theft facilitated by staff members at the hotel itself.
- As guests at the HCTA and participants of the planned conference are likely to be perceived as affluent foreign nationals, criminal elements may have a heightened intent to conduct opportunistic criminal acts, in particular petty theft.
- The underlying threat from terrorism in Angola cannot be dismissed, but is currently assessed to be low to negligible, with no recent history of attacks conducted in Luanda.
- The surrounding threat environment is characterised by a low frequency of low-intensity incidents and has a high density of security forces guarding government installations and other commercial properties in the area.

b. Site Security Assessment

- Overall security measures at the HCTA are assessed to be able to mitigate most likely threats encountered at the site.
- Extensive operational links to nearby security forces, well-established emergency response procedures and a notable presence of armed government security forces at the site were observed.
- Sources of concern were identified in the physical outer perimeter defences of the compound as well as in search protocols for individuals visiting the site.
- Security provisions were found to be nonetheless adequate given the reduced threat levels in the encompassing operating environment.

Security Threat Assessment

The below section will consider threats specific to the HCTA. However, whilst the document seeks to remain succinct, at times it is deemed necessary to consider the wider threats to both Luanda and Angola in general, in order to give an understanding of the potential implications for the site.

Overall, Angola is a permissive operating environment, particularly when compared to its immediate neighbours. However, continued tensions between the incumbent government, the secessionist “Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda” (FLEC) in Cabinda Province as an exclave of Angola and the main opposition party National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) remains a source for concern, with indications of a further escalation of tensions and politically-motivated violence. As such, the main threats in Angola include both opportunistic and organised forms of criminal activity, civil unrest and other forms of politically-motivated violence. No presence of transnational terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State (IS) group, has been reported in the country to date, although a residual risk of terrorist activity remains nonetheless given the relative proximity of the country to regions with operational groups (DRC, Mozambique).

The country’s largest population centres, i.e. Luanda, Cabinda and Benguela, are considered to be the main hotspots for criminal activity. The border regions with DRC and Zambia offer additional threats from explosive remnants of war (ERW), arms traffickers, mineral smuggling and – particularly in the case of DRC – operations by transnational armed criminal groups. Security forces, while susceptible to corruption and instrumentalisation by the government in the suppression of the opposition, have been mostly effective in containing domestic and transnational crime in Angola. However, the reported tendency of police officers to use excessive violence against suspected criminals and members of the opposition as well as the solicitation of bribes from locals and foreign nationals alike limit their effectiveness.

a. Crime

There is a moderate level of crime in Luanda, especially opportunistic robberies of mobile phones and other valuables. The use of firearms has been reported in several incidents and robberies have taken place both in daylight and during hours of darkness, including in areas frequented by foreign nationals. While incidents of criminal activity can occur at any time of day, they remain more prevalent at night due to lower chances of detection by security forces.





Armed robberies, violent assaults, vehicle-hijacking and other types of higher-impact crimes are less common. However, opportunistic low-intensity robberies remain the primary threat to visitors and foreign nationals in Luanda, including those committed or facilitated by staff members of hotels, which remains a concern in most high-end hotels in similar threat environments. Outside of the capital, the Provinces of Cabinda, North Lunda and South Lunda in particular record higher levels of incidents. Armed groups are active in Cabinda and there have been reports in the past of violent attacks targeting foreigners in all three Provinces. Other hotspots have been identified as the Island of the Cape, the connection between the Marginal of Luanda and the Miramar, as well as towns adjacent to the capital.

On 23rd April 2019, a 41-year-old male Portuguese national was shot and killed by unknown armed assailants on board a motorcycle in Talatona. The deceased was reportedly attacked while on his way to a restaurant to watch a football match. Prior to this incident, three other Portuguese nationals were shot dead by armed assailants in different locations within the capital. Police arrested a group of six criminals in May 2019 accused of having conducted the shootings as part of attempted vehicle-hijackings and robberies targeting the Portuguese nationals. Security forces also arrested two private security guards for allegedly supplying firearms to the criminal group. In June 2018, police arrested over 240 suspected criminals and seized 38 illegal firearms during a three-day operation conducted in different parts of Luanda under “Operation Tiger”. A similar operation was conducted in January 2019, when 105 suspected criminals were arrested on various charges in different parts of Luanda and 16 illegal firearms were seized. Finally, in July 2019, security forces conducted “Operation Reinforcement” in different parts of Luanda and arrested over ten individuals. Two Chinese nationals, who were accused of having stolen items from the residence of another Chinese national in a gated community in Talatona, were also arrested during the operation.

b. Kidnapping

The threat of kidnapping remains elevated in some parts of Angola, as incidents concerning kidnap-for-ransom have been reported in the past. High-profile targets, particularly foreign nationals, have been targeted in particular. Areas of concern have been identified in the municipalities of Viana, Cazenga, Cacuaco, Belas and the districts of Kilamba-Kiayi, Maianga and Samba. In November 2015, a significant rise in kidnap cases of Chinese nationals prompted the Chinese government to demand that Angola does more to protect foreign nationals operating in the country. In March and April 2016, a Lebanese-Belgian and French national respectively were abducted. Kidnappings of foreign nationals and other forms of organised criminal activity have been attributed to a general deterioration of the economy, which remains heavily oil-dependent, exacerbated by low global oil prices. At the same time, the country has observed a rise in the presence of foreign nationals with business interests in the country, who present suitable targets for local criminal elements. On 10th April 2019, the US Department of State issued a travel advisory for Angola highlighting the risk of kidnapping to its citizens.

Outside of major cities, the risk of kidnapping remains highest in the Northern parts of Angola, along the border with the DRC. Border towns such as Dundo frequently experience cross-border attacks by suspected armed rebel groups, targeting locals and foreigners indiscriminately. The



risk of militias and criminal groups abducting foreigners for ransom should be considered, particularly during longer stays in the border area. Similarly, in Zaire Province, which shares borders with the DRC and the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), the risk should be considered elevated.

c. Smuggling

Angola is the third largest producer of diamonds and the second largest oil producing state in Africa, while the government maintains that additional vast diamond reserves within the country still remain unexploited. The Angolan government has indicated that exploration has remained unable to attract the necessary foreign investment due to rampant corruption, human rights violations and widespread smuggling of its mineral resources from the diamond-rich Provinces of Malange, Lundas and Moxico. As a result, the government has tightened security along its border with the DRC, Zambia and Namibia in an effort to combat smuggling across the country's border. Angola allows only companies that partner with the state-run "Endiama" to conduct diamond exploration activities, in a bid to halt illegal diamond smuggling.

Angola has also been identified as a major transit hub for the trafficking of other illegal goods, such as narcotics, arms and ivory. The smuggling of fuel from Angola to neighbouring countries including Namibia has been cited by local officials as a threat to oil sector. The Namibian Ministry of Mines and Energy indicated that illegal fuel smuggling activities had been reported at the Oshikango Border Post in the Ohangwena region, through which large amounts of illegal fuel are smuggled into Namibia. On 11th December 2018, at least 3,350 liters of diesel which had been smuggled from Angola were seized in Mbanza Kongo, Zaire Province.

While the illicit trade of arms, narcotics and minerals is mainly centered at the country's border with the DRC, human trafficking routes run primarily from South Africa and Angola through Zambia to Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi. Refugee populations from across both East and Southern Africa have been known to pass through Angola on their way to South Africa in search for employment opportunities. Beyond serving as a route for human traffickers, Angola also has a substantial population of individuals sold by traffickers as indentured servants to illegal mining sites in the DRC.

As of 2019, Angola hosted 37,000 refugees from DRC, who are accommodated in several refugee camps throughout the Northern region of the country. No larger populations of refugees are known within Luanda itself. While no large-scale criminal activity centered on refugee camps has been reported, it is noted that poor socio-economic conditions in these camps combined with possible links to armed groups in DRC could result in heightened levels of opportunistic crime within and near their locations.

d. Civil unrest

Demonstrations, protests and strikes occur with a moderate frequency in Angola, particularly in urban areas such as Luanda. Although demonstrations and protests have reduced following a peaceful general election that was held in 2017, several human rights groups and civil society groups have held protests demanding accountability by the government over alleged human rights abuses, high unemployment rates and endemic corruption within the government and the



security apparatus. It is advised to avoid all demonstrations and protests, as they have the potential to turn violent and security forces have been reported to employ a heavy-handed approach when dispersing protests.

Civil society organisations from the Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte Provinces demanding more autonomy from the central government regularly stage protests and marches in the two Provinces. Proponents argue that the Lunda ethnic group, centred in the Northeastern Lunda Provinces and neighbouring DRC, should have a heightened role in the administration of local affairs. The Angolan government, however, has thus far denied requests to relinquish more control over the diamond-rich Lunda Provinces. During the latest rounds of protests in February 2018, local Lunda activists stated that over 4,000 individuals protested in Cafunfo, Cuango and Capenda-Camulemba and that security forces opened fire on the crowds, resulting in at least one fatality. Activists have also alleged forced disappearances and other human rights violations are being perpetrated by security forces against Lunda leaders. As a result of these localised ethnic tensions, the threat of civil unrest is assessed to be elevated in both Lunda Provinces.

e. Road traffic accidents

Road traffic accidents (RTAs) are one of the leading causes of death in Angola. This has been attributed to a general disregard for road safety regulations by most motorists. Common causes for road traffic accidents include poor driving habits, driving under the influence, driving non-roadworthy vehicles and over-speeding. Insufficient infrastructure and maintenance combined with a generally sparse presence of traffic police officers on the roads outside population centres further contribute to the prevalent issues of road safety. In addition, police officers have been reported to falsely accuse motorists of traffic offences in an attempt to obtain bribes. The Interior Ministry's Broad Consultative Council indicated that at least 1,000 civilians are killed in road traffic accidents annually in Angola. Provinces which have previously recorded the highest numbers of RTAs include Benguela, Huíla, Huambo and Bié.

On 20th August 2019, seven individuals, including a Chinese national, were killed following a road traffic collision involving a truck which reportedly drove into a building in Sumbe city, Southern Cuanza Sul Province. On 03rd October 2018, at least 18 individuals were killed in Chongoroi-Katengue District, Benguela Province, following a road traffic collision involving two lorries.

f. Terrorism

There is residual risk of terrorism in Luanda. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC) is the only known local group that has in the past targeted foreign companies, usually in the interior of Cabinda Province. The most recent high-profile attack was observed on 08th January 2010, when FLEC gunmen attacked a bus transporting the Togolese national soccer team to the African Cup of Nations tournament hosted in Cabinda, killing three individuals and injuring nine others. Armed attacks conducted by the group, while small in overall numbers, have occurred with little or no prior warning. In recent years, FLEC's ability to conduct attacks has significantly reduced due to an increased presence of security forces in Cabinda Province. Furthermore, the risk of attacks from



the FLEC is assessed to currently be focused exclusively in the Cabinda exclave and therefore poses a minimal risk to Luanda.

Meanwhile, terrorist threats from radical religious groups, most notably the Islamic State (IS) group and its African affiliates remain a concern, however, it is stressed that these groups have never carried out an attack in Angola. To date, no known presence of transnational terrorist groups in Angola has been indicated by researchers, media reports or security forces. However, given the globalised nature of the threat from such groups, the possibility of an attack perpetrated by them in Luanda cannot be excluded.

g. UXOs

Landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXO) present a hazard outside major cities in Angola. It is recommended for visitors to exclusively use well-developed roads and paths, as mined areas are often unmarked. Certain areas of Angola, particularly in the South – Benguela, Huila, Huambo, Bie, and Cuando Cubango Provinces – have a higher number of landmines and UXO than other areas of the country. However, the threat of UXO in Luanda is assessed to be negligible. Mine-clearing efforts spearheaded by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) continue to be undertaken in an effort to decrease the threat. Progress has been made by these organisations, with the envisioned goal of Angola being declared landmine-free by 2025. On 21st September, the 12th brigade of the Special Demining Unit announced that at least 2,404km² in Bengo and Luanda Provinces had been cleared of UXOs between 2006 and 2019.

Conclusions

The overall threat level at the HCTA is considered to be **low**, with no inhibitive risks identified during the assessment. Security measures in terms of access control, building security and technical security at the site are assessed to effectively mitigate most common security threats prevalent in Talatona in specific and Angola in general. The presence of a large number of armed private security forces and police personnel at the site represents a valuable addition to the hotel's overall security. The steel rollers installed on all hotel floors and the entrance gates to the underground parking area represent an additional security measure, which speaks to well-established emergency response procedures, which can be coordinated from the well-equipped central operations room on site. Finally, despite its ineligibility as a primary evacuation vehicle, the possibility of an evacuation of high-importance clients from the premises via the helicopter pad on the roof is noteworthy. The size of the encompassing compound allows for sufficient space for an evacuation of both guests and staff members from the building at a safe distance in case of a fire emergency, while still maintaining access routes for emergency response vehicles.

However, several notable weaknesses were identified in the security measures at the HCTA. The primary issue is the weak perimeter control measures currently in place at the site. Without higher external perimeter walls or an electric fence element, assailants remain able to bypass the outer defences of the hotel with relative ease, while the secondary entrance gate in particular offers only little in the way of physical defences. The uncontrolled border with the neighbouring CCT building – although understandable given the common management between



both entities – should be separated by an additional manned perimeter with a separate access gate. While security personnel onsite appeared to be well-versed in their respective SOPs, the overall numbers of security personnel are somewhat inadequate given the substantial size of the compound and the aforementioned weaknesses in external perimeter defences. The absence of checks of pedestrians and vehicles also remains a source for significant concern, as potential assailants can enter and leave the premises with potentially dangerous – or stolen – items with virtually no resistance.

Overall, Angola represents a relatively stable operating environment. Political tensions and associated security threats from civil unrest and politically-motivated violence are assessed to have reduced following the election of President João Lourenço and his MPLA administration. However, the ongoing conflict between the Angolan government, the main opposition party UNITA and the separatist FLEC group in Cabinda exclave nonetheless remains a cause for concern, as supporters of both factions have engaged in riots, civil unrest and armed attacks targeting rival supporters in the past. The age-old standoff between Cabinda and the central government is grounded in fundamental historical, socio-cultural and economic issues which are unlikely to be resolved in the short or medium-term and the Angolan Government continues to use the country's security apparatus to suppress the opposition and FLEC.

Opportunistic and organised criminal activity remain the primary threat in Angola, most prominently so within urban centres, such as Luanda, Benguela and Cabinda. Foreign nationals in particular are considered high-value targets due to their perceived wealth and connection to the Oil & Gas sector in the country and are advised to take additional security precautions when travelling, particularly during hours of the night. Vehicle-hijackings and armed robberies have been reported in Talatona in the past, despite repeated large-scale operations conducted by security forces. The prevalence of firearms in these incidents remains of particular concern, as it indicates elevated capabilities on the part of criminal groups, who likely profit from a proliferated presence of firearms in the country as a result of the protracted civil war, which only ended in 2002.

Nonetheless, it is noted that levels of criminal activity are lower than in most capital cities in Africa, and the comparably new municipality of Talatona in particular is characterised by upscale housing complexes and entertainment venues, most of which are assessed to be too hardened to be targeted by criminal groups. In the case of the HCTA, the abovementioned direct, established operational linkage between the hotel security team and government security forces officials as well as the hotel's status as a semi-governmental institution significantly increase the security resources at the disposal of the hotel. Meanwhile, this status also likely further deters criminal groups from targeting the site, given the heightened attention any security incident would most likely receive from security officials. It is reminded that the HCTA is one of the established venues for visiting Presidents and other high-level representatives and no significant security-related incident has been reported at the site itself or in its immediate vicinity to date.



Finally, it is noted that the Security Manager onsite noted that some of the shortcomings in the hotel’s mitigation measures outlined above – such as the relatively low number of security personnel, the lack of search protocols and the open perimeter towards the CCT – are addressed during larger conferences, when overall security is reportedly significantly tightened. However, the conducted security assessment was necessarily based on conditions as they were found at the time and thus cannot offer an analysis on the effectiveness of these potentially heightened mitigation measures.

ANNEX 1 – Risk Matrix

Quantifying Risk: A Methodology

The SF risk matrix is designed to provide the reader with a visual representation of the threat breakdown specific to a site. The assessment should not be considered generic for the area and all ratings take into account the profile of the site. SF has worked extensively with our methodology for quantifying risk. Whilst it is accepted that some level of informed qualitative assessment is necessary, subjectivity is removed where possible. Parameters have been modified and variables extensively and constantly reviewed to provide a dynamic and accurate representation of the threat level. It must be noted that although the risk matrix is a useful aid, it should be utilised in conjunction with the full discursive risk assessment, rather than independently. All ratings are assessed for an **unmitigated** site.

Risk is calculated as **likelihood** multiplied by **impact**. A number of guidelines suggest that likelihood should be assessed solely on historical precedence. This is considered overly simplistic and as such SF assess ‘likelihood’ for each threat by calculating the mean rating for the following, each ranked out of 5:

- **Historical Precedence:** how many incidents have there been over the past year?
- **Capability:** what capacity do malcontents have to launch an attack of this sort against the target?
- **Intent:** Based on the target / project’s profile, would a group have the intent to move against it?
- **Vulnerability:** Could the target defend itself against attack?¹

SF assess the impact of a threat as the mean rating for the effect on people, assets, the environment and the organisation’s reputation. Each category is ranked 0-5 based on the following guidelines:

	People	Assets	Environment ²	Reputation
0	No health effect / illness	No damage	No effect	No impact
1	Slight health effect/ illness	Slight damage	Slight effect	Slight impact

¹ Unmitigated will be rated at least 3

² ‘Environmental impact’ as a rating is specific to OGP guidelines. However, In many contexts, the terms ‘environs’ or ‘ immediate surroundings’ are assessed to be more relevant. Effectively, what is the spatial impact?

2	Minor health effect / illness	Minor damage	Minor effect	Limited impact
3	Major health effect / illness	Local damage	Local effect	Considerable impact
4	Single fatality	Major damage	Major effect	National impact
5	Multiple fatalities	Extensive damage	Massive effect	International impact

Both likelihood and impact are thus rated out of 5 for each threat. The likelihood and impact ratings are then multiplied together to produce a risk rating ranging from 0-25.

0 - 4	Negligible
4.1 - 7	Low
7.1 - 12	Moderate
12.1 - 16	High
16.1 - 25	Very High

Crime

Armed crime conducted by both opportunistic and organised criminal groups remains the primary threat at the site, and the threat level is assessed to be moderate. As observed above, criminals maintain the capability of conducting organised armed attacks. Although a robbery or armed attack on the hotel itself is assessed to be highly unlikely, individuals travelling to and from the site may be targeted in the vicinity of the HCTA. It is further advised not to display personal valuables such as jewellery and watches when in public in order to avoid being attacked. In addition, the threat of petty theft facilitated by hotel staff members cannot be dismissed.

The overall impact of forms of opportunistic criminal activity – i.e. petty theft, street robberies – is assessed to be moderate, however, its likeliness is relatively high considering socio-economic conditions within the country and the high value foreign nationals and individuals employed by prominent companies represent to criminals. Conversely, while the general impact of more organised forms of crime is higher, its likelihood is only moderate.

Opportunistic	Likelihood: 3.25 Impact: 2	Risk Rating: 6.5 (LOW)
Organised	Likelihood: 3 Impact: 2.5	Risk Rating: 7.5 (MODERATE)

Terrorism

It is noted that this heightened profile and known connection to the Angolan government would render the HCTA a highly valuable target for transnational terrorist groups (IS, al Qaeda). While several Embassies maintain a presence in the villa complex of the HCTA, no Embassy considered to be particularly high-risk (US, Israel) is among them. At the same time, it is stressed that no indications of an operational or logistics cell of any such group has been reported in Angola to date, thus greatly reducing the likelihood of such an incident taking place. Based on historical precedent from other theatres, any terrorist attack would likely involve the use of small explosive devices as a typical *modus operandi*, most likely combined with an armed attack. Both types of attack could result in multiple fatalities and severe damage to assets, though an



explosive attack would likely cause more asset damage. The reputational damage to the client in the event of an attack is likely to be high.

Terrorism	Likelihood: 1.5 Impact: 4.25	Risk Rating: 6.3 (LOW)
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Kidnap for ransom

While there have been abductions in Luanda in the past, their overall numbers have remained low. However, the risk remains notable, particularly for foreign nationals due to their perceived wealth. The impact of a kidnapping would most likely be significant, as both personnel and reputation could be severely affected. Although the nature of the conference and the high profile of the HCTA means that participants would likely pose valuable targets for kidnappers, the extent of the mitigation measures on site are likely to mitigate potential attacks. However, kidnappings conducted whilst in transit to the site or from one of the adjacent entertainment venues must also be considered, particularly given the potential longer stay of participants of the conference in Luanda and the resultant establishment of daily personal routines.


Kidnap for Ransom	Likelihood: 2.5 Impact: 3	Risk Rating: 7.5 (MODERATE)
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Civil unrest

Incidents of civil unrest are relatively uncommon in Luanda outside of election periods. However, when they do occur, common triggers are labour, land and politically-motivated conflicts. Incidents tend to focus on large population centres, such as Luanda and Cabinda, where the potential for mobilisation is heightened, although Talatona municipality is not a known hotspot for civil unrest.

The impact of protests is therefore likely to be limited, although transport to and from the site from the Airport could conceivably be affected. Nonetheless, larger protests may escalate and turn violent with little prior indication and result in the burning or stoning of vehicles and pedestrians, exacerbated by the involvement of security forces, who may deploy teargas and live ammunition to disperse protestors. In the unlikely event that protests would target the site directly, these impacts would be amplified, in addition to further reputational damage.

Civil Unrest	Likelihood: 2.5 Impact: 2.5	Risk Rating: 6.25 (LOW)
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With the correct mitigation measures in place, all threats to the site are considered to be acceptable (all fall into the orange segment). No threats are considered terminal to the hotels' operations (red).

FOR ANY ENQUIRIES REGARDING THIS REPORT OR ANY OTHER COMPANY DELIVERABLES,
PLEASE CONTACT:

INFORMATION & ANALYSIS TEAM

Email: infoteam@salama-fikira.com

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